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BARUCH COLLEGE – CUNY
CONCEPTUAL NATURE OF THE 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX
Abstract: This paper examines a long-standing controversy about the 
conceptual nature of the corporate income tax: whether it is an ex-
pense, a loss, a distribution of income, or some anomalous item. That 
controversy reflects in part different theories of the accounting entity.
 Despite several authoritative pronouncements stating or implying 
that the tax is an expense, and despite an extensive discussion in the 
academic and professional literature, the controversy has never been 
fully resolved. Additionally, the tax is not characterized as an expense 
in corporate financial reports. The FASB’s conceptual framework does 
not resolve this controversy, nor does the impending joint FASB-IASB 
revised conceptual framework. 
 Within the context of a coalesced (or fused) proprietary-entity 
theory of the accounting entity, this paper leads to the unsurpris-
ing conclusion that the corporate income tax is an expense, albeit 
an expense with some remarkable characteristics. Additionally, this 
paper shows how the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax 
impacts its income statement and cash flow statement reporting, and 
how a better understanding of this conceptual controversy might pre-
clude fruitless controversies over other accounting issues currently 
troubling accountants and accounting standard setters. 
INTRODUCTION
Most academic and practicing accountants of a certain age 
are familiar with the long-standing controversy over the finan-
cial accounting for corporate income taxes. This controversy 
centered on whether to ignore deferred income taxes under the 
flow-through method or recognize them under some version of 
interperiod income tax allocation. It was largely resolved in the 
U.S. [ARB-23, 1944; APB-11, 1967; SFAS-96, 1987b; SFAS-109, 
1992] and internationally [IAS-12, 1998; IAS-12 (Revised), 2006] 
Acknowledgments: The author gratefully acknowledges the help of li brarian 
Rita Ormsby (Baruch College) in accessing many of the references. He also grate-
fully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions of Aloke Ghosh, Jan 
Sweeney, two anonymous reviewers, and Dick Fleischman. One anonymous re-
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in favor of comprehensive interperiod income tax allocation un-
der the asset-liability method. Less well known and understood, 
however, is an even older controversy about the conceptual na-
ture of the corporate income tax: whether the tax is an expense, a 
loss, a distribution of income, or some anomalous item, and how 
its conceptual nature affects its reporting on the income state-
ment and cash flow statement.1 In turn, the conceptual nature of 
the income tax relates to the entity concept in accounting and to 
the different theories of the accounting entity. The FASB concep-
tual framework does not resolve this controversy, nor does the 
impending joint FASB-IASB revised conceptual framework show 
much promise of resolving it [see FASB, 2008a, 2008b].
Surprisingly, the conceptual nature of the corporate income 
tax has never been fully resolved [e.g., Storey, 1966, p. vii]. 
Most accountants and accounting standard setters say that the 
corporate income tax is an expense. However, companies do 
not characterize corporate income taxes as an expense and do 
not report it among expenses on the income statement. Most 
companies report an income statement deduction as “provision 
for income taxes” or just “income taxes,” rather than as “income 
tax expense.” Moreover, this deduction may not include all of 
the income taxes for the period. Due to intraperiod income 
tax allocation, corporate income tax may be reported partly in 
discontinued operations, extraordinary gain or loss, other com-
prehensive income, prior period adjustment, and/or additional 
paid-in capital. 
Initially, this paper examines the entity concept in account-
ing and three theories of the accounting entity: the proprietary, 
entity, and residual equity theories.2 It then examines an exten-
1 Actually, how the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax affects its 
reporting on the cash flow statement is a relatively new controversy, at least in the 
U.S. As such, this controversy may be largely unfamiliar to most U.S. accounting 
academics and practitioners. See the section “Relevance of the Conceptual Nature 
of Income Tax to Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement Reporting.”
2 There are three other theories of the business entity that have received con-
siderable attention in the literature: the enterprise, commander, and the fund 
 theories. However, these three theories are not especially relevant to the concep-
tual nature of the corporate income tax. For a further discussion of the enterprise 
theory, see Suojanen [1954], ASSC [1975], Hendriksen [1977, pp. 494-495], Kam 
[1990, pp. 314-318], and Schroeder et al. [2009, pp. 501-502]. For a further discus-
sion of the commander theory, see Goldberg [1965, p. 161-172], Meyer [1973, p. 
163], Hendriksen [1977, pp. 497-498], Kam [1990, pp. 312-313], Wolk et al. [2004, 
pp. 147-148], and Schroeder et al. [2009, p. 502]. For a further discussion of the 
fund theory, see Vatter [1947], Hendriksen [1977, pp. 495-496], Kam [1990, pp. 
310-312], Wolk et al. [2004, p. 147], and Schroeder et al. [2009, p. 501]. 
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sive literature on the conceptual nature of the corporate income 
tax and how its conceptual nature affects its reporting on the 
income statement and cash flow statement. This paper demon-
strates that within the context of a coalesced (or fused) proprie-
tary-entity theory of the accounting entity, the corporate income 
tax is best viewed as an expense. It also shows how a better un-
derstanding of this conceptual controversy may preclude fruit-
less controversies over other accounting theory issues currently 
troubling accountants and accounting standard setters.3
ENTITY CONCEPT
A long-standing basic postulate of accounting is the entity 
concept; namely, economic activity is conducted through spe-
cific units or entities, and the financial account ing should be ex-
pressed in terms of a clearly defined entity, separate and distinct 
from the parties who furnish the funds [Paton, 1922, p. 16-17; 
Gilman, 1939, pp. 25-26; Paton and Littleton, 1940, p. 8; Vatter, 
1947, p. 10; Moonitz, 1961, pp. 12-14; AAA, 1957, p. 537, 1965, 
pp. 358-367; Ball, 1988, p. 73; IASC, 2001, para. 8].4 The entity 
concept has been defined in various ways as follows: 
•	 The	 distinctive	 unit	 upon	 which	 accounting	 is	 based	 is	
the private business entity. The accountant looks upon 
business operations essentially through the eyes of the 
particular group of managers and owners. Accounting 
classifications and procedures are significant only as 
they are related to the conditions of the specific business 
 organization [Paton, 1922, pp. 16-17].
•	 A	unit	of	business	 is	but	a	means	of	 specifying	 the	area	
of attention, a delimited and prescribed set of activities 
3 Studying the history of this controversy illustrates Schumpeter’s [1954, p. 5] 
concept of the filiation of ideas: “the process by which man’s ef forts to understand 
economic phenomena produce, improve, and pull down analytic structures in 
an unending sequence.” To follow and extend Schumpeter, much more than in 
other disciplines it is true in eco nomics (and accounting) that modern problems, 
methods, and results cannot be fully under stood without some knowledge of how 
economists and accountants have come to reason as they do. As the subsequent 
discussion will demonstrate, this filiation of ideas process is especially true of the 
study of the unresolved controversy over the conceptual nature of the corporate 
income tax.
4 Ball [1988, pp. 8-9] distinguishes between an accounting entity and a report-
ing entity. The distinction arises because many organizations comprise a number 
of distinct, identifiable, accounting entities but report as a single reporting entity. 
Examples include parent and subsidiary companies that report as a single consol-
idated entity in the private sector and governmental funds that report as a single 
governmental unit in the public sector. 
3
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which give rise to the kinds of data with which account-
ing is to deal [Vatter, 1947, p. 10]. 
•	 A	 business	 entity	 is	 a	 formal	 or	 informal	 unit	 of	 enter-
prise, a collection of economic goods and services and 
a group of persons, organized to accomplish certain ex-
press or implied purposes [AAA, 1957, p. 537].
•	 The	 economic	 unit	 that	 has	 control	 over	 resources	 ac-
cepts responsibility for making and carrying out commit-
ments and conducts economic activity [Moonitz, 1961, p. 
13]. 
•	 Anything	 that	 is	 viewed	 by	 an	 interested	 individual	 or	
group as having a separable and definable existence is an 
entity. The essence of an entity is its separate existence 
from a particular point of view [AAA, 1965, pp. 358-359]. 
•	 A	 reporting	 entity	 is	 any	unit	 or	 activity	which	 controls	
the utilization of scarce resources to generate economic 
benefits or service potentials, and which is sufficiently 
significant to warrant preparing general purpose financial 
reports for economic decision making and accountability 
[Ball, 1988, p. 73].
•	 A	 reporting	 entity	 is	 an	 entity	 for	 which	 there	 are	 us-
ers who rely on the financial statements as their major 
source of financial information about an entity [IASC, 
2001, para. 8]. 
•	 A	 circumscribed	 area	 of	 business	 activity	 of	 interest	 to	
present and potential equity investors, lenders, and other 
capital providers [FASB, 2008b, para. S2]. 
A committee of the AAA [1965, p. 359] notes that the natures 
of the interests of individuals or groups which serve to identify 
entities and define their boundaries are many and varied. They 
may be circumscribed from a legal point of view; but they also 
may be defined from an economic, social, political, aesthetic, 
professional, or other point of view. Interestingly, the extant 
FASB conceptual framework lacks a concept of the reporting 
entity and the extant IASC Framework [2001, para. 8] discusses 
it only briefly. 
Zeff [1961, pp. 96-97] and Stewart [1989, pp. 98-99] note 
two dimensions of the accounting entity concept, which they 
refer to as the “orientation postulate”: (1) the subject of financial 
statements, such as a business enterprise, which they refer to 
as the first sub-postulate; and (2) the users of those statements, 
such as creditors and investors, which they refer to as the sec-
ond sub-postulate. Following Zeff and Stewart, in a May 29, 
2008 Preliminary Views document jointly developed with the 
4
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IASB,5 the FASB [2008b, para. 6] notes that general purpose 
financial reports provide information about a particular entity, 
which it refers to as a reporting entity; it then draws a distinc-
tion between the subject (entity) of general purpose financial 
reports and the users of those reports such as equity investors 
and lenders:
Those reports provide information about the entity’s 
economic resources (i.e., its assets), claims on those 
resources (i.e., its liabilities and equity), and the effects 
of transactions and other events and circumstances that 
change an entity’s resources and the claims on them. It 
is the entity itself that is the subject of financial report-
ing, not its owners or others having an interest in the 
entity. 
The FASB [2008b, paras. 17, 22] notes that legal structure 
helps to establish the boundaries of the reporting entity be-
cause it helps to determine which resources, claims on those 
re sources, and changes in those resources or claims should be 
included in the entity’s financial reports. But it concludes that 
a reporting entity should not be limited to activities structured 
as legal entities. Rather, a reporting entity should be broadly de-
scribed as a circumscribed area of business activity that would 
apply to a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, 
branch, or group of entities.
In a separate May 29, 2008 Exposure Draft jointly developed 
with the IASB, the FASB [2008c, para. OB6] notes that an entity 
obtains economic resources from capital providers in exchange 
for claims on those resources. It concludes that “by virtue of 
those claims, capital providers have the most critical and imme-
diate need for general purpose financial information about the 
economic resources of an entity.” Thus, the FASB concludes that 
the subject of general purpose financial reports should be the 
entity, not its capital providers, and the primary users of those 
reports are all its capital providers, not just its equity investors.
CENTRALITY OF THE ENTITY CONCEPT  
IN ACCOUNTING THEORY
As Moonitz [1961, pp. 13, 31] notes, the significance of the 
entity concept to accounting is that it defines the area of interest 
5 For succinctness, subsequent references in this paper are to the FASB rather 
than to both the FASB and the IASB; similarly, subsequent references to joint 
documents are to documents published by the FASB rather than to those pub-
lished by the IASB.
5
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and thus narrows the possible objects and activities and their 
attributes that may be selected for inclusion in financial state-
ments. According to an AAA Committee [1965, p. 361], deter-
mining what data are relevant depends on the prior determina-
tion of the reporting entity. When a definable area of economic 
interest exists, it is possible to identify, accumulate, and report 
financial information about that entity distinct from all other 
information. This is the essence of the entity concept in account-
ing. Without such an entity, accounting is impossible.6 Similarly, 
in its Preliminary Views, the FASB [2008b, para. 62] concludes 
that “the reporting entity concept should first determine what 
constitutes the ‘entity’ that is reporting, and only then should 
the asset definition (and other element definitions) be applied to 
that entity.”7 
The primary concern of financial accounting is with entities 
that represent areas of economic interest to particular individu-
als and groups; that is, with entities whose activities involve the 
utilization of scarce resources. An economic entity could be a 
business, a governmental unit, or a not-for-profit organization; 
that is, any activity concerned with the administration of scarce 
resources. However, this paper is concerned only with one type 
of entity, the business corporation, because only this type of en-
tity is subject to corporate income taxes.8
RELATIONSHIP OF THE ENTITY CONCEPT  
TO OTHER ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS 
The AAA Committee [1965, p. 360] notes that the entity con-
cept is more fundamental than the concepts of going concern, 
money measurement, and realization. The application of these 
other concepts depends on the nature of the entity and the needs 
of the particular interested individual or group. On the other 
6 Salmonson [1969, p. 51] alludes to a certain circularity in the definition of 
the accounting entity when he notes that the boundaries of the accounting entity 
depend solely upon the point of view taken. Since there are many different users 
of accounting information with differing points of view, there are many different 
and often overlapping entities.
7 Most of the FASB Preliminary Views [2008b, paras. 29-161] document on 
the reporting entity addresses the issue of consolidated versus separate parent 
company financial statements. As such, that document is not otherwise relevant 
to the present paper on the nature of corporate income taxes and is not further 
examined. 
8 Certain partnerships may elect to be taxed as corporations under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Most of the issues addressed in this paper also apply to such 
partnerships.
6
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hand, these concepts do not have significance apart from the 
entity. For example, the concept of going concern has no appli-
cation to entities where the interest of the individual or group is 
liquidation. As to the concept of money measurement, a tract of 
timber may constitute an entity for which a meaningful account-
ing may be made in terms of board feet. Realization depends on 
the business entity assumed. Intercompany profits on upstream 
inventory sales are realized by the subsidiary at the time of sale 
to the parent company, but are unrealized by the consolidated 
entity until the inventory is resold to outsiders.
Similarly, periodic net income and its components only have 
relevance to specific accounting entities. For this reason, the en-
tity concept is more fundamental than the concept of periodic 
net income. Without the accounting entity clearly defined, peri-
odic net income cannot be measured and the conceptual nature 
of its components cannot be determined.
DIFFERENT THEORIES OF ENTITY
Through the years, various authors have suggested differ-
ent theories of the business entity for accounting purposes. This 
paper summarizes the proprietary, entity, and residual equity 
theories.9 Thereafter, it examines the conceptual nature of the 
corporate income tax and how it fits into these three theories. 
However, as Zeff [1961, pp. 96-97] and Stewart [1989, pp. 98-
99] note, none of these theories is completely satisfactory at 
determining the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax 
because none fully distinguishes between the subject being ac-
counted for and the party for whose benefit the financial state-
ments are prepared.
Proprietary Theory: According to Sprague [1907, pp. 46-50, esp. 
p. 49], an early advocate, under the proprietary theory, the ac-
counting represents a reckoning by the proprietor for his own 
property.10 In this view, the fundamental accounting equation is 
Assets – Liabilities = Owners’ Equity.11 The business entity is the 
9 The entity concept (a business entity exists apart from the personal affairs of 
its equity holders) is presumed by all three theories; they differ in how they view 
the business entity [Hendriksen, 1977, p. 490].
10 Chatfield [1974, pp. 221-223] and Previts and Merino [1998, pp. 209-210] 
summarize statements of the proprietary theory that predate Sprague.
11 The fundamental accounting equation is A–L=OE. However, A–L=Net As-
sets. Thus, OE=NA. In a 1989 monograph on the concept of equity, Kerr [1989, 
pp. 33-34] suggests that although net assets and owners’ equity are measured in 
the same way and will always have the same amount assigned to them, they may 
7
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center of attention, but it is to the viewpoint of the proprietor 
that the accounting is directed. Implicitly, the business enter-
prise is the subject being accounted for, and the proprietor is 
the party for whose benefit the financial statements are prepared 
[Stewart, 1989, p. 102]. Under the proprietary theory, capital 
is viewed as a stock of wealth, and income is de fined as the 
amount that can be consumed or distributed without reducing 
capital.
Chatfield [1974, p. 223] elaborates that under the propri-
etary theory, revenues immediately increase proprietorship, ex-
penses immediately decrease it, and net income accrues directly 
as wealth to the owner. As a result, revenues and gains can be 
treated alike since all go to owner’s equity and affect it similarly. 
For similar reasons, little distinction need be made between ex-
penses and losses.
As Zeff [1961, pp. 97-105] notes, the proprietary theory was 
applied initially to the medieval merchant when most commer-
cial activity was organized as time-limited, distinguishable ven-
tures, such as voyages or caravans. When the venture was con-
cluded, a profit or loss could be unambiguously calculated as the 
difference between the merchant’s wealth at the beginning and 
conclusion of the venture. At that time, accountants did not sep-
arate business from personal affairs; their main concern was as-
certaining the amount of changes in the merchant’s wealth. The 
merchant was both the subject and beneficiary of the financial 
statements. However, with the evolution of capitalism, economic 
activity became organized increasingly as continuing business 
enterprises rather than as discontinuous trading ventures. Con-
currently, accountants adopted the going-concern assumption, 
decided to separate business from personal affairs, and applied 
the proprietary theory to sole proprietorships and partnerships. 
Implicitly, the proprietorship or partnership became the subject 
and the proprietor/partners became the primary beneficiary(ies) 
of the financial statements.
However, the proprietary theory has long been applied to 
corporations by looking through the corporate veil and consid-
ering the stockholders collectively as the proprietary interest 
[Hatfield, 1909, pp. 144-183, esp. pp. 145-146]. The accounting 
thereupon becomes a reckoning by management for the stock-
be regarded as separate concepts: “The concept of net assets is appropriate when 
attention is centered on the resources which are available to an entity whilst own-
ers’ equity is appropriate when attention is focused on the owners’ interest in the 
enterprise.”
8
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holders’ property. To use Zeff’s construct [1961, pp. 105-106], the 
corporation became the subject and the stockholders became 
the primary beneficiary of the financial statements.
In criticizing the proprietary theory, Previts and Merino 
[1998, pp. 221-222] note that “the business entity concept (the 
fact that the legal entity existed apart from its ownership), was 
not questioned, only ignored, by proprietarists.” Perhaps a more 
accurate criticism of the proprietary theory is that its advocates 
did not emphasize the distinction between the corporation as 
the subject and the stockholders as the primary beneficiary of 
the financial accounting. Nevertheless, the accounting for the 
corporation is completely separate from the accounting for 
the personal wealth of the stockholders under the proprietary 
theory.
Schroeder et al. [2009, pp. 498-499] find “significant [extant] 
accounting policies that can be justified only through acceptance 
of the proprietary theory.” Ball [1988, p. 89] concludes that the 
proprietary theory predominates in practice, at least in Aus-
tralia. Similarly, Hendriksen [1977, pp. 489-490] notes that the 
proprietary theory is implied in many extant accounting prac-
tices and terminology relating to corporations. For example, the 
net income of a corporation is often referred to as net income to 
stockholders.
Under the proprietary theory, revenues and expenses are 
simply increases or decreases in stockholders’ equity, respec-
tively. As a result, net income equals the change in stockholders’ 
equity over the period other than changes due to additional con-
tributions from or distributions to stockholders. Consistently, 
under the proprietary theory, corporate income taxes and inter-
est on debt are viewed as expenses to be deducted from revenues 
to determine net income, whereas dividends are withdrawals of 
capital.12
Entity Theory: As Zeff [1961, pp. 106-107] notes, with the separa-
tion of ownership and control in the modern corporation [see 
also Berle and Means, 1932] came another shift in accounting 
emphasis towards the enterprise itself and away from the stock-
12 See Hatfield [1927, pp. 373-374] and Moonitz [1957, pp. 175-176]. Sprague 
did not address the accounting for corporate income taxes in his book, which bore 
1907 and 1908 copyrights, when there was no federal corporate income tax in the 
U.S. The current federal corporate income tax emanates from legislation enacted 
in 1909, reaffirmed by the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913, and 
subsequently amended. A federal corporate income tax was enacted in 1862 to 
help finance the Civil War, but it was repealed in 1872.
9
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holders as the collective owners. But this shift was not complete 
under the proprietary theory, so it was argued, for under the pro-
prietary theory, the stockholders’ viewpoint remains the focus 
of the financial statements [see also Gilman, 1939, p. 48]. The 
entity theory, to be distinguished from the entity concept and 
the entity theory of consolidated financial statements [Moonitz, 
1944],13 was developed ostensibly to make this shift in emphasis 
more complete.
Paton [1922, pp. 84-89] is perhaps the first American to of-
fer a comprehensive statement of the entity theory.14 According 
to Paton, the business entity is not just the center of attention. 
Rather, the viewpoint of the business entity is the viewpoint to 
which the accounting should be directed. Under the entity theo-
ry, long-term debt and capital stock are considered more similar 
than different. Long-term creditors and stockholders are con-
sidered both separate and apart from the business entity itself 
(pp. 76-79). In this view, the fundamental accounting equation 
is Assets = Liabilities + Stockholders’ Equity. As Kerr [1989, p. 5] 
notes, the distinction between liabilities and stockholders’ equity 
is “one of degree rather than of fundamental differences.”
Under the entity theory, according to Paton [1922, p. 259], 
net income is the “increase in all [creditor and stockholder] 
equities,” and coincides with the viewpoint of the corporate 
manager:
To the manager, the particular manner in which the 
company is capitalized is a matter entirely outside the 
determination of operating net income. . . . Net oper-
ating revenue [income] is then the excess of values 
13 Under Moonitz’s entity theory of consolidated financial statements, a par-
ent and subsidiary are viewed as one economic entity with two groups of stock-
holders, the controlling stockholders of the parent company and the noncontrol-
ling  stockholders of the subsidiary. The FASB [2007b] largely adopted the entity 
theory of consolidated financial statements in SFAS No. 160. Prior practice was 
largely based on the parent company theory of consolidated financial statements. 
Unlike the three more pervasive theories of the accounting entity, the parent 
company and entity theories of consolidated financial statements apply solely to 
consolidated financial statements. Additionally, the same issues concerning the 
conceptual nature of income taxes and interest on debt arise under both theories 
of consolidated financial statements. 
14 Chatfield [1974, pp. 223-224] and Previts and Merino [1998, p. 222] summa-
rize earlier statements of the entity theory. Interestingly, Paton [1922, pp. 61-68] 
espouses a managerial point of view, not the entity theory. However, numerous 
writers [Husband, 1938, pp. 242 et passim; Gilman, 1939, pp. 46-54; Vatter, 1947, 
pp. 5-7; Stewart, 1989, p. 102] refer to Paton’s managerial point of view as his 
entity theory. This paper continues that practice.
10
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received over purchased assets utilized in connection 
with product sold, and represents the increase in capital 
to be apportioned or distributed among all individuals 
or interests who have committed cash funds or other 
property to the undertaking.
Consistently, interest on long-term debt is viewed as a dis-
tribution of income similar to dividends on stock [Paton, 1922, 
p. 267]; neither is an expense to be deducted from revenues to 
determine net income under the entity theory.
In commenting on the entity theory, Chatfield [1974, pp. 
225-226] elaborates that “if the corporation is functionally sepa-
rate from its owners and creditors then it, not they, should be 
the center of accounting interest,” which implies a wider view 
not only of the business but of accounting activities generally. 
Additionally, Chatfield suggests that “the entity theory empha-
sizes corporate income and a more nearly economic idea of 
income measurement.” He notes that unlike the proprietary 
theory, under the entity theory: 
Revenues and expenses are no longer simply increases 
or decreases in stockholder’s equity. Revenues are com-
pensation for services provided by the firm. Expenses 
measure the cost of services consumed in obtaining this 
revenue. Profit accrues to the corporation, not to its 
owners or creditors. Its disposition is up to the entity; 
income distribution is distinct from income finding [de-
termination].
Staubus [1952, pp. 105-107] offers a different version of the 
entity theory from a managerial point of view. Under Staubus’ 
version, “insofar as managers have a viewpoint towards the in-
come of business that can be distinguished from the viewpoint 
of owners, distributions to creditors and owners, like distribu-
tions to employees [and taxes], are costs [expenses].” Wolk et al. 
[2004, pp. 144-145] observes that under orthodox entity theory:
. . . owners’ equity accounts do not represent their 
interest as owners but simply their claims as equity 
holders. Similarly, net income does not belong to the 
owners although the amount is credited to the claims 
of  equity holders after all other claims have been satis-
fied. Income does not belong to capital providers until 
dividends are declared or interest becomes due. In 
 measuring income, both interest and dividends repre-
sent distributions of income to providers of capital.
Husband [1938, pp. 246-247, 1954, pp. 555-556] adds that under 
11
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a consistent application of the entity theory, stock dividends are 
income to the stockholders, although he finds this to be an in-
herent defect of the entity theory. 
Zeff [1961, pp. 187-188] distinguishes Paton’s version of the 
entity theory from Staubus’ version (and subsequent elabora-
tions) as traceable to a dis agreement over the meaning of the 
word “entity”: Staubus views the managers or the entity itself 
as the parties for whom the financial statements are prepared, 
whereas Paton does not establish either the managers or the 
entity as the dominant beneficiary of financial statements. Zeff 
characterizes Staubus’ conception of the entity as the “institu-
tional-entity view”; he characterizes Paton’s managerial view of 
the entity as the “distributional-entity view.” Because manage-
ment acts in a fiduciary capacity in reporting to outsiders, not to 
itself, Zeff [1961, p. 205] concludes that the distributional-entity 
view of Paton is to be preferred over the institutional-entity view 
of Staubus.15 
Zeff [1961, pp. 129-140, 188] also notes that, just as with the 
proprietary theory, it is useful under the entity theory to distin-
guish between the subject being accounted for and the party for 
whose benefit the financial statements are prepared. Implicitly, 
under Paton’s conception of the entity theory, the business en-
terprise is the subject being accounted for and its capital suppli-
ers, both creditors and stockholders, are the parties for whose 
benefit the financial statements are prepared [see also Stewart, 
1989, p. 102].
Clark [1993, p. 26] suggests that because modern capital 
structure theory literature supports the notion that financing 
activity impacts operating cash flow and vice versa, corporate 
financial policy appears to affect firm value. Although this does 
not invalidate the idea that both bondholders and stockholders 
supply capital to the firm, it does raise doubts that debt can be 
viewed in the same light as equity as under the entity theory. 
Previts and Merino [1998, p. 213] add that although many view 
Paton’s entity theory as an advance in conceptualizing the ac-
counting entity, its underlying assumptions are inconsistent with 
private property rights and have never been accepted: “Account-
ing theory today continues to adopt a proprietary focus; that is, 
man agers should maximize stockholders’ wealth, rather than an 
entity focus.” 
15 Staubus’ view and its elaborations is also a decidedly uncommon interpre-
tation of the entity theory. Additionally, Staubus abandons his version of the entity 
theory in favor of the residual equity theory, discussed in the next section. 
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According to Paton’s original formulation [1922, pp. 180-
181, italics added], where the long-term creditors and stockhold-
ers are implicitly the beneficiaries of the financial statements, 
the corporate income tax is viewed as a distribution of income 
akin to dividends on stock: 
Taxes in general constitute a coerced levy on net earn-
ings (or capital if no earnings are available) . . . The 
state virtually has a latent prior equity in the properties 
of every business enterprise; private ownership is not 
absolute. . . . Income and excess-profits taxes furnish, 
of course, a clear case. Here the state is levying spe-
cifically upon net earnings (derived in general from the 
stockholders’ standpoint) and consequently such levies 
from an accounting view represent distributions of net 
revenue. 
However, Paton also notes that the corporate income tax 
could fall into one of four classifications – an expense, a loss, 
a distribution, or an anomalous item. He suggests that the tax 
“can best be considered a loss . . . or a distribution . . .; it can-
not reasonably be viewed as an expense.” Similarly, Paton and 
Littleton [1940, p. 102] conclude that “interest and income taxes 
. . . are not costs of producing the economic service which ac-
counts for the revenue from sales.” But as a result of the higher 
tax rates of the 1940s, Paton [1943, p. 13] changed his mind and 
concluded that all taxes, both income taxes and property taxes 
are not an expense, loss, or distribution of income, but rather 
are an anomalous item that should be deducted from revenues 
to compute corporate net income. 
Accordingly, the entity theory is subject to different interpre-
tations. The treatment of corporate income tax under the entity 
theory is also subject to several interpretations, even by Paton, 
its developer. However, the prevailing interpretation is that the 
corporate income tax is a distribution of income under the en-
tity theory.
Residual Equity Theory: As suggested initially by Staubus [1959], 
under the residual equity theory, the fundamental accounting 
equation becomes Assets – Specific Equities = Residual Equity, 
where specific equities include those of creditors and preferred 
stockholders. Staubus [1959, p. 8, italics in originial] defines 
residual equity as “the equitable interest in organization assets 
which will absorb the effect upon those assets of any economic 
event that no interested party has specifically agreed to absorb”; 
13
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the residual equity  holders “are that group of equity claimants 
whose rights are superseded by all other claimants.” Under the 
residual equity theory, common stockholders are viewed as hav-
ing a residual equity in the income of the business and in the 
net assets upon final liquidation. According to Staubus, the focal 
point of investors’ interest in the income statement should be 
the change in the residual equity. 
Meyer [1973, p. 117] notes that advocates of the residual 
 equity theory consider the proprietary theory inadequate be-
cause it treats as identical the interests of various stockholder 
groups that are basically antagonistic to one another. Such an-
tagonism results from the desire of the lowest ranking investors 
to minimize returns to the highest ranking investors while the 
latter seek to maximize these returns. The entity theory may be 
similarly criticized for ignoring the antagonism of creditors and 
stockholders.
Under the residual equity theory, because the common 
stockholders are viewed as having a residual equity in the in-
come of the business and in the net assets upon final liquidation, 
the income statement should report the income available to the 
residual equity holders after all prior claims are met, includ-
ing interest on debt, income taxes, and dividends to preferred 
stockholders.16 Accordingly, income taxes and dividends to pre-
ferred stockholders are more akin to expenses than to income 
distributions. As a result, Meyer [1973, pp. 117-118] and Wolk 
et al. [2004, p. 146] suggest that the residual equity theory is a 
variant of the proprietary and the entity theories. Zeff [1961, p. 
188] characterizes Staubus’ residual equity theory as having the 
entity as the subject and the common stockholders as the princi-
pal beneficiary of the financial statements.
Although U.S. and international accounting standard setters 
have not adopted the residual equity theory, it has considerable 
conceptual appeal as a more accurate description of the modern 
publicly owned corporation than either the proprietary or en-
tity theories. Its conceptual appeal stems from its treatment of 
preferred stock as more similar to debt than to common stock. 
Moreover, because the FASB and IASB tentatively favor a basic 
16 Hendriksen [1977, p. 493] notes an alternative and decidedly uncommon 
interpretation of the residual equity theory. Because the common stockholders’ 
only claim against the corporation is to receive dividends when and if declared, 
the residual equity in capital is not assigned to the residual equity holders. Both 
the initial capital supplied by the common stockholders and the retained earnings 
are equity of the corporation in itself. 
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ownership approach to the definition of equity, future adoption 
of the residual equity theory is not inconceivable.17
The conceptual nature of the corporate income tax is the 
same under the proprietary and residual equity theories; the 
income tax is an expense to be deducted from revenues to derive 
net income available to all equity holders under the proprietary 
theory and to residual equity holders under the residual equity 
theory. For this reason, advocates of the proprietary and residual 
equity theories suggest some of the same arguments for viewing 
the income tax as an expense. Moreover, the literature on the 
conceptual nature of the corporate income tax is usually in the 
context of the proprietary and entity theories, with little mention 
of the residual equity theory. This paper continues that practice 
in order to minimize duplication.
AUTHORITATIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS ON  
NATURE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX
Since 1944, several U.S. authoritative pronouncements 
group corporate income tax with expenses and/or state or imply 
that it is an expense. However, these pronouncements do not 
explain why the tax is an expense.
For example, in Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 
23 [1944, para. 3], the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
(CAP) states that “income taxes are an expense which should be 
allocated, when necessary and practicable, to income and other 
accounts, as other expenses are allocated.” That view was reaf-
firmed in 1953 by the CAP in ARB No. 43 [ch. 10, para. 4]. The 
CAP’s successor, the Accounting Principles Board (APB), recon-
firmed that the corporate income tax is an expense in Opinion 
No. 11 [1967, para. 12(a)]. Similarly, the successor to the APB, 
the FASB, assumes that corporate income tax is an expense in 
SFAS No. 96 [1987b, paras. 26-28] and again in SFAS No. 109 
[1992, paras. 35, 45-46]. However, all of these authoritative pro-
nouncements merely assert or assume that the corporate income 
tax is an expense rather than a loss, a distribution of income, or 
something else without explaining why.
17 See FASB, Preliminary Views [2007a, paras. 16-49]. Under this basic owner-
ship approach, a financial instrument is classified as equity only if it is the most 
subordinated interest in an entity and if it entitles its holder to a share of the 
entity’s net assets after all higher priority claims have been satisfied. All other 
financial instruments, such as forward contracts, options, and convertible debt, 
are classified as liabilities or assets. As a result, only the lowest residual interest in 
the entity is classified as equity. The basic ownership approach is fully consistent 
with the residual equity theory.
15
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Even in its conceptual framework statements, the FASB dis-
cusses the nature of the corporate income tax only superficially. 
Financial Accounting Concept Statement (SFAC) No. 3 [1980, 
para. 65] and SFAC No. 6 [1985, para. 80] define expenses as 
“outflows or other using up of assets or incurrences of liabilities 
(or a combination of both) from delivering or producing goods, 
rendering services, or carrying out other activities that consti-
tute the entity’s ongoing major or central operations.” Moreover, 
in discussing the characteristics of expenses, SFAC 6 [1985, 
para. 81, italics added] notes explicitly that income taxes are an 
expense:
Expenses represent actual or expected cash outflows (or 
the equivalent) that have occurred or will eventuate as 
a result of the entity’s ongoing major or central opera-
tions. The assets that flow out or are used or the liabili-
ties that are incurred . . . may be of various kinds – for 
example, units of product delivered or produced, em-
ployees’ services used, kilowatt hours of electricity used 
to light an office building, or taxes on current income.
In a fundamental sense, this SFAC 6 discussion of the character-
istics of expenses defines away the controversy as to the concep-
tual nature of income taxes without indicating the reasons why 
income taxes are an expense rather than a loss, a distribution of 
income, or something else. 
Additionally, SFAC 6 seems to distinguish between other 
expenses and income taxes as if to imply that income taxes may 
not really be an expense. For example, it [para. 137] defines 
transaction as “an external event involving transfer of some-
thing of value (future economic benefit) between two (or more) 
entities,” and distinguishes an exchange and a nonreciprocal 
transfer. In an exchange, both entities receive and sacrifice 
value, such as purchases or sales of goods or services, which ul-
timately become expenses or losses. In a nonreciprocal transfer, 
an entity incurs a liability or transfers an asset to another entity 
or receives an asset or cancellation of a liability without directly 
receiving or giving value in exchange. Importantly, SFAC 6 notes 
that impositions of taxes, like investments by owners, distribu-
tions to owners, gifts, and charitable or educational contribu-
tions given or received, are nonreciprocal transfers. In the con-
text of different types of transactions, therefore, income taxes 
are in some ways more similar to distributions to owners than 
to expenses. So the conceptual nature of the corporate income 
tax has not been fully resolved by SFAC 3 or SFAC 6.
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Interestingly, at one time, the SEC [1945, p. 151] suggested 
that the corporate income tax might be viewed more appropri-
ately as a distribution of income rather than as an expense: 
It is readily apparent that normal and excess profits 
taxes are computed as a part of taxable income. Unlike 
most expenses they exist if, and only if, there is net tax-
able income before any deduction for such taxes. There 
is much to be said therefore for the position that true 
income taxes are in the nature of a share of profits tak-
en by the government. If it is desired to place emphasis 
on the necessity of deducting them in order to arrive at 
net profit available to shareholders, they may perhaps 
be called an expense – but in such cases they represent 
a very special class of expense, one that is incurred only 
by the making of net taxable income. 
However, the SEC has always required corporations to treat 
the corporate income tax as a separate deduction from revenue 
to derive periodic net income. At no time did the SEC either 
require or permit the treatment of the corporate income tax as a 
distribution of income rather than as a deduction in computing 
periodic net income.
In summary, authoritative pronouncements in the U.S. treat 
the corporate income tax as an expense or deduction in calculat-
ing periodic net income, but without adequately explaining why.
NATURE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX  
UNDER DIFFERENT THEORIES OF ENTITY
Through the years, numerous commentators have analyzed 
the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax, treating 
it either as an expense, a loss, a distribution of income, or an 
anomalous item, along the lines suggested by Paton [1922, p. 
181]. The most common question is whether the income tax is 
an expense or a distribution of income. Many of these analyses 
have implicitly presumed one theory of the reporting entity, 
often without specifying which theory is presumed or to whom 
the financial statements are directed. 
Income Tax as Expense or Distribution of Income: Paton [1922, p. 
181], the first American writer to advocate the entity theory, sug-
gests that the corporate income tax is a distribution of income, 
not an expense. Another early advocate of the entity theory 
[Seeger, 1924, pp. 103] elaborates that because the government 
is a partner in production and as such is entitled to a share of 
17
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the wealth produced, the income tax is a distribution of income, 
not an expense, and should not be deducted from revenue to de-
termine entity net income. 
Dewhirst [1972, pp. 42-43] also argues that the income tax 
is a capital distribution, which he implies is the same as an 
income distribution. He defines expense as the productive use 
of resources to generate revenue, where a causal and purposive 
relationship exists between expense and revenue; he defines loss 
as the unproductive use of resources. He notes that no relation-
ship exists between income taxes and the receipt of government 
services or revenues earned. Because the income tax does not 
involve either the productive or unproductive use of resources 
or services to generate revenue, Dewhirst concludes that the in-
come tax is neither an expense nor a loss. He also assumes that 
it is not a new category of revenue deduction. By a process of 
elimination, Dewhirst concludes that the income tax is a capital 
distribution.
Other writers are more circumspect in discussing whether 
the income tax is an expense or a distribution of income. For 
example, in discussing whether taxes of railroads are expenses 
or distributions of income, Hatfield [1927, p. 374] notes:
It is impossible to say that any one of these views is 
absolute and exclusive. . . . If the stockholder has his 
dividends lessened by the taxes paid, but in all prob-
ability would pay no taxes were his funds invested, say, 
in bonds or mortgages, the taxes are, from his point of 
view, in no sense a distribution of profits. But where 
there is an income tax uniformly enforced, and the pay-
ment of taxes by the [rail]road works merely as a stop-
page of that part of the income, it is not illogical to con-
sider the tax as a distribution of part of the net profits 
derived from operating the road.
Similarly, Greer [1945, p. 96-97] notes that whether the in-
come tax is an expense or a distribution of income depends on 
one’s viewpoint. If the government is viewed as a part-owner, the 
income tax is a distribution of income; if it is viewed as a sup-
plier of goods or services, it is an expense. According to Greer, 
the government is better viewed as a part-owner; the absence of 
government equity on the balance sheet reflects that its equity 
“is not in the property, but in the earnings, of the corporation.”
Paton [1946, p. 86] finds persuasiveness in Greer’s concept 
of the government as a part-owner that shares profits with 
stockholders. However, because the government makes no 
investment, and because taxes are a coerced levy, Paton finds 
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it unrealistic to view the government as an equity holder. Zeff 
[1961, pp. 155-156] is still more critical; he suggests that view-
ing the government as an equity holder that does not contribute 
funds is an ethereal notion:
Creditors . . . and stockholders seek equity in profits 
. . . but they also furnish funds. To the extent that it is 
desirable that ‘equities’ consist of a collection of ho-
mogeneous ‘rights,’ inclusion therein of a ‘right’ that is 
not attended by a contribution of capital is not to be 
recommended. By such inclusion, a party represented 
as realizing an infinite return on investment would be 
permitted to distort the aggregate return on investment 
of those parties who do provide some capital.
In support of treating the corporate income tax as a distri-
bution of income, some entity theorists [e.g., Hill, 1957, p. 357] 
contend that its incidence is upon the stockholders, that the 
corporation in effect is paying a tax on the stockholders’ income. 
Proprietary theorists [e.g., Hendriksen, 1958, p. 218] contend 
to the con trary, maintaining that the incidence of the tax is 
elsewhere. To add to the confusion, both Hendriksen [1965, p. 
369] and Li [1961, p. 266] maintain that the incidence of the tax 
alone does not conclusively determine its conceptual nature, i.e., 
whether it is an expense or a distribution of income. Moreover, 
it has long been recognized [Harberger, 1962; Gravelle, 1995; 
Auerbach, 2005] that the incidence of the corporate income tax 
has not been determined conclusively either in theory or empiri-
cally.
Both proprietary and entity theorists recognize certain obvi-
ous differences between corporate income taxes and expenses 
in general. Pro prietary theorists [e.g., Hendriksen, 1958, p. 217] 
maintain that the similarities outweigh the differences, whereas 
entity theorists [e.g., Paton, 1922, pp. 179-181] argue to the 
contrary. More specifically, proprietary theo rists like Hendrik-
sen [1965, p. 465] argue that income taxes, like other expenses, 
represent payment for services required by the entity to further 
its operations; they may be associated with the right to conduct 
a profitable corporation in a favorable business environment, 
certainly a valuable service supplied by the government. Entity 
theorists like Paton reject this contention, arguing instead that 
income taxes are coerced levies largely outside of managerial 
control, representing the latent prior beneficial interest of the 
government in every business entity. Moreover, these levies do 
not further the operations of the entity. To substantiate this 
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 position, entity theorists note that unlike most expenses, income 
taxes are not apportioned in accordance with services received 
from the government; rather, they are apportioned and contin-
gent on the existence of taxable income although the entity pre-
sumably receives the same services regardless of the amount of 
its taxable income and any tax thereon. Accordingly, entity theo-
rists contend that income taxes cannot be viewed as measuring 
the value of services and, later, a cost of production or expense.
Additionally, although he views the corporate income tax as 
an expense and not as a distribution of income, Sprouse [1957, 
p. 374, italics added] notes that:
. . . the imposition of income taxes might be looked 
upon as a method of siphoning off a substantial por-
tion of corporate income to finance the [government] 
services. . . . From this point of view, income taxes might 
well be treated as a distribution of corporate income. 
. . . This necessarily assumes that the incidence of the 
corporate income tax falls upon the incorporated insti-
tution; that the tax is not shifted forward in the form of 
higher  prices for the corporation’s product or shifted 
backward in the form of lower prices for the factors of 
production.
In refutation, some proprietary theorists, including Sprouse, 
argue that income taxes are an expense, even under a consistent 
application of the entity theory:
The state and federal governments are not corporate in-
vestors. Accordingly, the number of dollars which could 
be distributed to corporate equity holders without im-
pairing their cumulative investment is clearly adversely 
affected by the imposition of income taxes. . . . Income 
taxes are expenses . . . an unavoidable cost of general 
business operations during a given revenue period.
Other proprietary theorists [e.g., Kelley, 1958, p. 214] note 
that to argue that income taxes are not a cost of carrying on 
a business enterprise and a determinant of net income “is to 
propose a concept of corporate net income which is illogical, 
contrary to common sense and contrary to universal business 
practice.” 
Taxes, whether levied on property or on income, consti-
tute a basic cost of carrying on a business, which must 
be paid to the all-powerful sovereignty, the State, for 
the privilege of remaining in business. In no true sense 
is the State a partner in the enterprise; it is a sovereign 
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demanding periodic payments for the privilege of carry-
ing on the activities of the corporation.
Still other proprietary theorists [e.g., Solomon, 1966, p. 201] 
argue that the non-proportionality of income taxes to services 
received or anticipated is irrelevant to their conceptual nature 
Some degree of government activity is beneficial to earning 
revenue by providing something of value, if only a favorable en-
vironment. Another proprietary theorist [McLaren, 1947, p. 164] 
notes that:
The Federal government is still intended to be the 
servant of the business public – not the master; it con-
tributes no capital, shares no losses, and is not an 
 equity holder. Viewed realistically, income taxes must be 
regarded as a cost of doing business; they are payments 
for protective services rendered by the government 
which, over the long term, enhance or at least preserve 
business opportunities.
And still other proprietary theorists [e.g., Mateer, 1965, pp. 
584-585] argue that the corporate income tax may be viewed 
as merely one way of allocating the cost of government among 
some of the corporations benefited. Even some entity theorists 
[e.g., Zeff, 1961, p. 168] conclude that income taxes “are the cost 
of establishing and maintaining a free economy within which 
pri vate enterprise can effectively attempt to attain profitable 
results. Translated into microeconomic terms, income taxes are 
thus a cost of a firm’s revenues.”
Furthermore, the method of measur ing the tax, its contin-
gency on taxable income, is held by other proprietary theorists 
[e.g., Sprouse, 1957, p. 375; Moonitz and Jordan, 1963, pp. 477-
489] to be irrelevant to its conceptual nature. Employee bonuses 
are often contingent on income; nevertheless, they are prop-
erly characterized as an expense, not a distribution of income.18 
18 It has been noted that, consistent with the proprietary theory, the corpora-
tion might be viewed as an agent for its stockholders in paying the tax that is 
really a tax on the income of the stockholders; hence, the tax is a distribution of 
income, not an expense [Hendriksen, 1965, p. 395]. However, the incidence of the 
corporate income tax has not been determined conclusively either in theory or 
empirically, and the incidence of the tax alone does not conclusively determine its 
conceptual nature. Additionally, this is a decidedly minority interpretation of the 
proprietary theory. Blackie [1947, p. 203] rejects a similar notion that the corpo-
rate income tax is really a tax on customers that is collected by the corporation on 
behalf of the government: “Such an idea rests on a cost-plus method of reasoning 
which assumes that price is the product of an arithmetical process rather than the 
result of economic forces which frequently defy the adding machine. The corpora-
21
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Even some advocates of the entity theory take this position. For 
example, Zeff [1961, p. 167] aptly notes:
. . . officers of many large corporations are voted bonus-
es by the directors on the basis of the profitability of the 
year’s operations. Are these bonuses, therefore, a ‘distri-
bution of income?’ The point of reductio ad absurdum 
would be reached very soon as more and more cost fac-
tors were found to have an affinity toward ‘income.’
Indeed, even some advocates of the entity theory contend 
that the corporate income tax is an expense. For example, Li 
[1961, pp. 265-268, esp. p. 266] argues that, consistent with 
the entity theory, the corporate income tax is best viewed as an 
expense. The tax is imposed upon a corporation because it is a 
separate entity and because it enjoys the privileges and advan-
tages of being a separate entity. Because the tax is directed at 
the corporation, it should be considered an expense of corporate 
administration. Hendriksen [1982, p. 165] also argues against 
viewing the income tax as a distribution, even if one otherwise 
subscribes to the entity theory. However, viewing income tax 
as an expense is not the prevailing interpretation of the entity 
theory.
Equally important, proprietary theorists [e.g., McLaren, 
1947, p. 164; Moonitz, 1957, p. 175] note that income taxes 
are considered an expense by businessmen themselves and 
are viewed as such in the business decision-making process. 
Walgenbach [1959, pp. 582-583] notes that the courts and most 
rate-making regulatory agencies also adopted this viewpoint.19 
For many years, the majority of the accounting profession has 
also adopted this view, at least as reflected in authoritative 
 pronouncements on the financial accounting for income taxes.
Income Tax as Expense or Anomalous Item: Most of the early 
writers debated whether the income tax is an expense or a 
 distribution of income. However, following Paton’s [1922, p. 
181] suggestion, some writers debated whether the income tax 
tion does not have the power to pay taxes or wages or any other cost without limit. 
The U.S. federal income tax – levied on the corporation as such – is neither a sales 
tax upon the customers nor a personal tax upon the stockholders.”
19 In general, the courts have regarded the regular corporate in come tax as an 
expense for determining net income, and the excess profits tax has been similarly 
regarded for ordinary net income determination purposes, but not generally for 
the rate-making purposes of the regula tory agencies [Walgenbach, 1959, pp. 582-
583]. 
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is an  expense or an anomalous item, often without considering 
whether it might be a loss or a distribution of income instead.
For example, Chambers [1968, pp. 104-105] argues that 
income taxes are not an expense because they are not levied 
in proportion to the benefits received by governments. He also 
argues that the income tax is not an excise tax on the right to 
operate and earn income because loss companies also have that 
right but pay no income tax. Additionally, Chambers notes that 
income taxes are levied on taxable income, which differs funda-
mentally from accounting income. Because taxable income 
reflects fiscal and policy functions of governments, Chambers 
concludes that income taxes “can only be regarded as a form of 
discriminatory expropriation.”
Barton [1970, pp. 4-8] supplements Chambers’ argument 
that the income tax is an expropriation. He suggests that to 
understand the nature of the corporate income tax, one must ex-
amine its purpose and the manner in which it is levied. Barton 
notes that income taxes are levied on taxable income in order 
to raise revenue to finance government activities. The measure-
ment of taxable income reflects government policies of raising 
revenue according to ability-to-pay, influencing the allocation of 
productive resources, and making the tax laws easy to adminis-
ter. According to Barton, because it reflects government policy 
objectives and administrative simpli fications, taxable income 
need have no relation to accounting income. As a result, corpo-
rate income tax is not related to specific transactions. For these 
reasons, Barton argues that corporate income taxes do not pos-
sess any of the characteristics of operating expenses.
Like Chambers, Barton also disputes the view that the in-
come tax is an expense because it represents a payment for the 
right to conduct a profitable business in a favorable economic 
environment. He notes that unlike expenses, income taxes are 
not proportional to services received from the government. 
Some of the largest companies pay relatively little tax because 
of various tax incentives though they often use more public 
services than smaller companies. He also disputes the view that 
income tax is an expense even though it represents a cost of con-
ducting a profitable business.
Additionally, Barton objects to the view that income tax is 
an expense because it fits the definition of expense as a reduc-
tion in proprietorship other than repayments to owners. Barton 
[1971, p. 173] finds that definition of expense to be too broad 
because it hides several important differences between items 
in the expense category and does not indicate the reason for 
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 incurring expenses. For example, the definition lumps income 
taxes (which reflect the success of a company’s operations), with 
sales taxes and bad debts (which relate to sales), and with wages 
and payroll taxes (which relate to the resources acquired by 
management to generate revenue).
However, Baylis [1971, pp. 161-165] aptly refutes Barton’s 
arguments that the income tax is not an expense. He finds that 
Barton’s criticism of the all-inclusive definition of expense does 
not mean that income tax is not an expense. He also finds Bar-
ton’s and Chambers’ term “expro priation” unappealing “because 
of its obvious link with the term appropriation.”
In responding to Baylis, Barton [1971, pp. 173-174] argues 
that the real issue is whether the expense classification is the 
most useful one available. Instead of defining expense broadly as 
a reduction in proprietorship other than repayments to owners, 
he favors classifying non-owner outlays as revenue deductions, 
expenses of generating revenue, non-operating losses, and ex-
propriations of profit. Barton argues that this four-way, mutually 
exclusive classification is more informative than classifying all 
non-owner outlays as expense.
Baylis [1971, pp. 162-164] counters that the government 
indirectly serves business by providing the valuable benefit of 
a favorable environment in which all may operate profitably 
and that income taxes need not be levied proportionate to the 
benefits received to justify classifying them as an expense. He 
observes that trade association membership fees are an expense 
although a larger company may pay twice as much as a smaller 
company without receiving twice the benefits. Similarly, the 
benefits received from paying income taxes may not be pro-
portionate to the amount paid. “These items [trade association 
membership fees and income taxes] qualify as expenses; they 
certainly couldn’t be called distributions of income.”
Moreover, Baylis notes that, like temperature, income taxes 
are an environmental cost. If a business chooses to work in a 
cold locale, it would incur more heating costs. Both heating 
costs and income taxes are environmental costs of business 
operations; hence, both are expenses properly charged against 
operating revenues.
Baylis maintains that for accounting purposes, the classi-
fication of an expenditure is determined by the reason why the 
payer makes that expenditure, not by the motives or desires of 
the payee:
To suggest that income taxes are not an expense because 
the government has imposed them to provide revenue 
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for its own purposes, or to help reach desired fiscal and 
economic goals or to achieve a redistribution of income 
within the economy, and so on, is the same as saying 
that wages paid to an employee should only be treated 
as wages in the accounts [of the employer] if that em-
ployee utilizes his wages in some specified manner. 
Finally, Baylis argues that the conceptual nature of the tax 
does not change because some companies pay more income 
 taxes than other companies or because of the way the tax is com-
puted. He disputes Barton’s contention that income taxes are not 
an expense because they are not a cost deliberately incurred in 
anticipation of future benefits. He notes that some other costs 
besides income taxes, such as bad debts, are not deliberately 
incurred, are not a result of managerial choice, are not control-
lable, but are appropriately classified as expenses. Additionally, 
the fact that income taxes are compulsory does not demonstrate 
that they are compulsory distributions of income rather than 
expenses. Rather, Baylis argues that companies presumably have 
chosen to accept compulsory income taxes as a condition of be-
ing able to conduct business in a particular country.20
Wheeler and Galliart [1974, pp. 51-63] also argue that the 
corporate income tax is an anomalous item rather than an 
expense. They reject the argument that whether the corporate 
income tax is an income distribution or an expense depends 
on whether its burden falls on stockholders or someone else. 
First, Wheeler and Galliart note that the tax may be something 
other than an expense or income distribution. Second, they 
suggest that who bears the burden of the tax is an unresolved 
question. They conclude that previous studies and authorita-
tive pronouncements offer no help in determining the nature 
of the income tax because they assume the problem away. They 
also argue that the various theories of the accounting entity do 
not determine the conceptual nature of the income tax because 
these theories lead to either ambiguous or contradictory conclu-
sions [see also, Dewhirst, 1972, p. 44].
Rather, Wheeler and Galliart attempt to ascertain the con-
ceptual nature of the corporate income tax by examining its 
essential characteristics. They argue that the corporate income 
tax is not a payment for the right to conduct business; that there 
20 In support of this choice by companies, one could also cite the trend start-
ing in the 1990s of American companies moving headquarters offshore to avoid 
federal income taxes. Presumably, those companies that do not move their head-
quarters offshore choose to continue to be subject to federal income taxes.
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is no direct relationship between the benefits a corporation 
receives from income taxes and the amount of income taxes 
paid; that the government, in its role as a tax collector, has no 
shareholder interest in a corporation; that the income tax is 
not a franchise fee; and that the income tax is a compulsory 
contribution. Wheeler and Galliart also note that an income dis-
tribution such as dividends is generally voluntary whereas the 
income tax is not so, hence is not a distribution. Additionally, 
although the income tax results from a combination of activities 
that are profit-directed, they argue that the income tax is neither 
an expense nor a loss because it does not generate revenue. By a 
process of elimination, they conclude that “because the income 
tax fails to qualify as a profit distribution, an expense, or a loss, 
it is an anomalous item.”
Interestingly, as a result of the vastly higher tax rates of the 
1940’s, Paton [1943, p. 13] concluded that the income tax is an 
anomalous item rather than an income distribution:
The terms ‘net income’ and ‘net profit,’ by long usage, 
imply the amount of earnings available for owners or 
investors, and are not at all appropriate to describe fig-
ures which may be eight or ten times the size of actual 
net corporate income or profits. As long as income and 
profits taxes were of rela tively small amount the report-
ing of such taxes as a prior participation in the net in-
come produced by the corporation was not particularly 
objectionable; under present conditions such reporting 
may be definitely misleading. To report ‘net profit before 
income and profits taxes’ of $50,000,000, for ex ample, 
when such taxes amount to say $40, 000,000, and actual 
net corporate income is only $10,000,000, borders on 
the fantastic. . . . 
McLaren [1947, p., 163] notes that federal income taxes were 
not treated as an allowable cost under government war contracts 
during the 1940s. Federal income and excess profits taxes are 
still not allowable costs under Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) 31.205-41(b) (1). The fact that federal income taxes are not 
allowable costs might suggest that income taxes are an income 
distribution or anomalous deduction from revenues to derive net 
income rather than an expense or loss. However, state income 
taxes are allowable costs under FAR 31.205-41(a) (1).21
21 The AICPA’s Audit & Accounting Guide for federal government contractors 
[2007] notes that federal income taxes are not allowable (para. 2.24), but that 
state income taxes are allowable costs for government contracts [para. 2.37].
26
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 36 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/5
57Nurnberg, The Corporate Income Tax
Federal and state income taxes have the same conceptual 
nature although the former are not allowable whereas the lat-
ter are. Consequently, it does not make sense to maintain that 
federal income taxes are an income distribution or anomalous 
deduction rather than an expense, whereas state income taxes 
are an expense. A more likely reason why federal income taxes 
are not allowable costs is that if they were allowable, contractor 
revenues and government expenditures would increase. But the 
increase in government expenditures would have to be offset by 
increases in income taxes for everyone. Presumably, the govern-
ment finds it easier and politically more palatable to disallow 
income taxes as an allowable cost of contractors rather than 
increase income taxes for everyone.
Paton [1943, p. 13] alludes to a similar rationale when he 
notes the similarity of sales allowances pursuant to government 
contract renegotiations and income taxes during the 1940s. 
Both are processes by which the government recovers excess 
payments for war products. If a particular renegotiation adjust-
ment is not made, a large part of the contested amount is still 
re covered as income and excess-profits taxes. Renegotiated con-
tract prices are properly treated as revenue deductions. Accord-
ing to Paton, so should income and excess-profits taxes:
. . . the artificiality of treating income and profits taxes 
as a preliminary distribution of corporate profits be-
comes evident. There simply are no profits in any ap-
propriate sense – at least as far as corporate reporting 
to stockholders is concerned – until the processes by 
which the total governmental recovery is determined 
have been fully applied.
Thus, even Paton concludes that the corporate income tax is 
not an income distribution, but rather an anomalous deduction 
from revenues to compute corporate net income.
Multiple Conceptualizations of Income Tax: Paton [1922, pp. 
269-70, lower and upper case as in the original] suggests the 
following presentation of interest, income taxes, and dividends 
consistent with his entity theory viewpoint.22
22 The terminology is updated slightly to conform to modern usage by substi-
tuting retained earnings for surplus and unreserved for unappropriated. Note that 
Paton favors combined income and retained earnings statements although they 
are usually separate in practice.
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OPERATING NET REVENUE $xxxx
Interest Earned     xxx $xxxx
Fire Loss      xxx




Interest on Mortgage Bonds $xxxx
Interest on Debentures xxx
Interest on Notes     xxx     xxx
[Unlabelled Subtotal] $xxxx
Federal Income and Profits Taxes  xxx
[Unlabelled Subtotal] $xxxx
Preferred Dividends     xxx
NET BALANCE FOR COMMON STOCK $xxxx
Common Dividends     xxx
Undivided Profits $xxxx
Retained Earnings, 1 January 20x3  xxx
Reserve for Contingencies     xxx
TOTAL UNRESERVED RETAINED EARNINGS, 
31 December 20x3 $xxxx
Although this presentation omits a figure labeled net in-
come, Paton’s Net Revenue to All Equities, Before Deducting [In-
terest and] Taxes is unequivocally his entity theory net income.23
Following Paton, some accountants [e.g., Blough, 1946, p. 
89; Mason and Davidson, 1953, p. 168; AAA, 1957, p. 540] argue 
that the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax depends 
on the viewpoint of financial state ment users. They argue that 
there is no one measure of periodic net income, but rather an 
array of measures for different purposes. To the stockholder, in-
come taxes and interest on debt are properly viewed as expenses 
to be deducted in computing net income available for distribu-
tion as dividends without impairing capital, consistent with 
the proprietary theory. From an enterprise viewpoint, however, 
 Mason and Davidson [1953, p. 168] argue that net income before 
income taxes and interest on debt is a more meaningful measure 
of the results of operations, consistent with the entity theory. 
Net income, so computed, can be more effectively compared 
from one period to another and from one enterprise to another 
because it is unaffected by variations in income tax policies and 
debt versus equity financial policies of otherwise comparable 
enterprises.
23 A consistent application of the entity theory would involve reporting corpo-
rate income taxes, along with other distributions, directly in the retained earnings 
statement, rather than the income statement [e.g., Huber, 1964, pp. 27-28]. How-
ever, starting with Paton, many entity theory advocates favor reporting income 
taxes in a combined income and retained earnings statement. Moreover, reporting 
corporate income taxes and interest charges directly in retained earnings never 
conformed to U.S. GAAP. 
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Other accountants dispute this apparent resolution as no 
resolution at all. For example, in criticizing the dual presenta-
tion of net income before and after income taxes, McLaren 
[1947, p. 164] notes that “the owners of a business are not 
concerned with any artificial sub-total, regardless of how it is 
labeled. What they want to know is how much the corpora tion 
has earned after all charges.” Kelley [1958, p. 214] also criticizes 
the dual presentation as confusing. Zeff [1961, p. 160, fn. 1], in 
criticizing a dual presentation of net income, asks rhetorically, 
“which of the two balances is meant to be the net income? A 
reader of such an income statement cannot tell.”
Sprouse [1957, p. 375] also questions the notion that “net 
income before income taxes” is a more comparable metric of 
enterprise profitability than “net income after income taxes.” 
He notes that from a managerial viewpoint, “tax planning 
represents an extremely significant factor in modern decision 
making on the part of corporation managers. This would seem 
to indicate that management’s primary concern is the amount 
of profits after taxes rather than…before taxes.” According to 
Sprouse, interperiod and interfirm profitability comparisons are 
facilitated by excluding non-operating revenues and expenses 
from net income, not income taxes.
Zeff [1961, pp. 213-215] offers a resolution of this issue. He 
favors limiting the use of the terms “income” and “net income” 
in the income statement to the return to the residual equity 
common stockholders, not to other capital suppliers:
Common stockholders participate in the residuum. 
Because the magnitude of their return is the most sensi-
tive of all to the vicissitudes of enterprise success, their 
natural mindfulness of swings in business activity war-
rants their return – if any return is to be so classified 
– to be singled out as ‘income’ (preferably called ‘net 
income’).
Instead of using the terms “income” or “net income” to the 
other capital suppliers on the income statement, Zeff suggests 
that the income statement should report “return to all capital 
suppliers” and “return to preferred and common stockholders” 
for these subtotals. Although Zeff’s suggestion might resolve the 
issue, practice continues to use the term “net income” to refer to 
“return to preferred and common stockholders,” not just “return 
to residual equity” (i.e., common stockholders).
Conclusions on the Conceptual Nature of Corporate Income Taxes: 
In accordance with the proprietary theory, corporate income 
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taxes are typically viewed as an expense. In accordance with the 
entity theory, they are typically viewed as an income distribu-
tion. However, as Wheeler and Galliart [1972, p. 55] conclude, 
neither the proprietary nor the entity theory determines un-
ambiguously the conceptual nature of corporate income taxes 
because each theory leads to either ambiguous or contradic-
tory conclusions or is interpreted differently by different writers. 
Moreover, neither theory is followed consistently in practice. 
Rather, as Husband [1938, pp. 252-253] noted, practice seems to 
mix them, often to the point of vacillation. 
Nevertheless, important lessons result from understanding 
the controversies over the different theories of the accounting 
entity and the conceptual nature of the corporation income 
tax. Perhaps the most important lesson is to understand how 
these controversies evolved in order to avoid needless entangle-
ments over other comparable theory controversies. However, 
the weight of logic leads inevitably to the conclusion that the 
corporate income tax is in fact an expense, not an income dis-
tribution, loss, or anomalous item. This conclusion relies in part 
on the definitions of the elements in the FASB conceptual frame-
work and in part on the following refinement of the proprietary 
and entity theories along lines suggested by Zeff.
It will be recalled that Zeff [1961, pp. 96-97] suggests that 
neither the proprietary nor entity theory is completely satisfac-
tory because neither theory fully distinguishes between the sub-
ject being accounted for and the principal party for whose ben-
efit the financial statements are prepared. Once the proprietary 
theory is applied correctly to the corporation, the corporation 
becomes the subject being accounted for, not the stockhold-
ers, and the stockholders remain the principal party for whose 
benefit the financial statements are prepared. Similarly, once the 
entity theory is applied correctly to the corporation, the corpora-
tion remains the subject being accounted for, and the stockhold-
ers become the principal party for whose benefit the financial 
statements are prepared, not the corporation or its managers.24 
24 Zeff [1961, p. 107] comes to a similar conclusion but he expresses it dif-
ferently. His proprietor-beneficiary version of the entity theory is essentially the 
proprietary theory where the corporation becomes the subject being accounted 
for and the common stockholders remain the principal party for whose benefit the 
financial statements are prepared. His equities-beneficiary version of the entity 
theory is essentially the entity theory where the corporation remains the subject 
being accounted for and the common stockholders become the principal party 
for whose benefit the financial statements are prepared. For Zeff [1961, pp. 211-
215], however, it is the common stockholders, not all the stockholders, who are 
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As a result, when applied correctly to the corporation, the pro-
prietary and entity theories coalesce into the same theory of the 
accounting entity. The corporation is the subject being account-
ed for and the stockholders are the principal party for whose 
benefit the financial statements are prepared. Within the context 
of this coalesced proprietary-entity theory, the corporate income 
tax is not an income distribution; rather, it should be deducted 
from revenues and gains to derive net income attributable to the 
stockholders.25
As to whether the corporate income tax deduction is an ex-
pense, a loss, or an anomalous item, the issue is best addressed 
within the context of some generally accepted definition of these 
items, such as the FASB’s conceptual framework. 
Within that context, corporate income taxes clearly fit the 
definition of an expense as an outflow of net assets resulting 
from an entity’s central or peripheral operations. This conclu-
sion presupposes several aspects of the FASB conceptual frame-
work: (1) the financial statements should articulate with one 
another; (2) a major objective of financial accounting is measur-
ing periodic net income; (3) periodic net income comprises the 
sum of the revenues and gains less the sum of the expenses and 
losses; and (4) the 1985 FASB definitions of assets, liabilities, 
comprehensive income, revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are 
not only self-evident but also fully consistent with the coalesced 
proprietary-entity theory of the accounting entity.26
Consistent with the FASB conceptual framework, the 
statement of financial position reports assets, liabilities, and 
stockholders’ equity as of a moment in time, while the income 
statement reports revenues, expenses, gains, and losses for a 
period of time. The statement of financial position reflects the 
fundamental accounting equation, Assets – Liabilities = Owners’ 
the principal party for whose benefit the financial statements are prepared. As 
such, his fused proprietary-entity theory evolves into the residual equity theory. 
Kam [1990, pp. 318-320] also suggests that elements of the proprietary and entity 
theories might be fused. 
25 This paper purposely slights over whether the principal party for whom 
financial statements are prepared should be all the stockholders or just the com-
mon stockholders. Either way, the corporate income tax should be deducted from 
revenues and gains to derive net income attributable to all the stockholders under 
the fused proprietary-entity theory or just the common stockholders under the 
residual equity theory.
26 Presently, the FASB and IASB are jointly developing a common conceptual 
framework to replace their separate conceptual frameworks. However, significant 
differences between the jointly developed common conceptual framework and the 
extant FASB conceptual framework are not anticipated.
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Equity under the proprietary theory, or Assets = Equities, where 
equities are either liabilities or owners’ equity under the entity 
theory. Because revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are defined 
in terms of changes in assets and liabilities, the financial state-
ments articulate with one another.
Under the FASB conceptual framework, comprehensive 
income has four basic categories. There are no anomalous 
deductions from revenues and gains to derive comprehensive 
income or any intermediate component of comprehensive in-
come. Conceivably, another two categories could be added to 
derive comprehensive income, namely, anomalous additions and 
anomalous deductions. However, adding two such anomalous 
“what-you-may-call-its” categories, to use Sprouse’s [1966] ter-
minology in a different context, would make the conceptualiza-
tion of periodic net income more complicated than it already 
is, involving six categories rather than four. Indeed, adding two 
anomalous categories might make comprehensive income itself 
anomalous.
The FASB conceptual framework does not encompass 
anomalous items. Although the deduction or addition of income 
taxes is often captioned a “provision” and reported apart from 
the other expenses, it should be understood that said provision 
is in the nature of an expense or, if a refund, an expense reduc-
tion, not an anomalous item. Characterizing the income tax 
deduction as a provision does not change its conceptual nature 
from expense to anomalous item anymore than characterizing 
bad debts or warranty costs as provisions changes their concep-
tual nature from an expense to an anomalous item.
Manifestly, the FASB’s definition of expense as an outflow 
or the using up of net assets resulting from an entity’s central 
operations subsumes the definition of expense as “a cost of ser-
vices consumed to obtain revenue” or, more simply, as “a cost 
incurred to generate revenue.”27 Thus, the above definition of 
expense reflects a coalesced proprietary-entity theory. Moreover, 
the FASB definition of expense explicitly includes income taxes. 
SFAS No. 109 [1992, para. 16] refers to deferred tax expense 
or benefit and total tax expense or benefit, not to deferred tax 
 
27 Chatfield [1974, p. 225] notes how the definition of expense differs under 
the proprietary and entity theories. Whereas expense is simply a decrease in 
stockholder’s equity or net assets under the proprietary theory, it is a cost of ser-
vices consumed to obtain revenue under the entity theory. The FASB definition 
subsumes the definitions under both the proprietary and entity theories.
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provision and total tax provision.28 Similarly, in the October 
16, 2008 Preliminary Views [FASB, 2008a, p. 71] document on 
financial statement presentation, the illustrative statement of 
comprehensive income includes a deduction captioned income 
tax expense, not income tax provision or just income taxes.
The conceptual distinction between revenue versus gain 
and expense versus loss relates to whether the item results 
from an entity’s ongoing major or peripheral operations, not its 
gross or net presentation [FASB, 1985, para. 84]. Revenue and 
expense are conventionally reported gross, whereas gain and 
loss are conventionally reported net. For example, sales revenue 
is reported gross, excluding the related cost of goods sold. Cost 
of goods sold is also reported gross, excluding the related sales 
 revenue. On the other hand, gain or loss on the sale of plant 
assets is reported net of the depreciated cost of the plant assets 
sold. Conceivably, the sale of plant assets could be reported 
gross, i.e., both the selling price and the cost of the assets sold 
could be reported separately as non-operating revenue and non-
operating expense respectively. Income taxes are incurred as a 
result of generating revenue, a major or peripheral activity of 
a business enterprise. Accordingly income taxes are an expense 
because they are a cost of generating that revenue, whether 
from operating revenue reported gross or from non-operating 
revenue reported net. Income taxes remain in nature an expense, 
whether reported gross as income tax expense when resulting 
from major or peripheral activities, or reported net when result-
ing from discontinued operations, extraordinary items, other 
comprehensive income, or prior period adjustments subject to 
intraperiod income tax allocation.
Besides being defined explicitly by the FASB as an expense, 
corporate income tax is an expense because it is an inevitable 
outflow or using up of net assets from major or peripheral ac-
tivities. Expressed more succinctly, the income tax is an expense 
because it is a cost of generating operating or non-operating 
revenue. Although the amount of income tax is not proportional 
to any benefits received from the government, neither is the 
amount of certain other costs proportional to the benefits re-
ceived from payees. Yet, these other costs are unambiguously ex-
28 SFAS No. 109 [1992, para. 16] defines deferred tax expense or benefit as 
“the change during the year in an enterprise’s deferred tax liabilities and assets,” 
excluding changes in deferred tax liabilities and assets due to business acquisition 
or dispositions during the year. It defines total income tax expense or benefit for 
the year as “the sum of deferred tax expense or benefit and income taxes currently 
payable or refundable.”
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penses, not distributions of income, losses, or anomalous items. 
Examples include fixed franchise fees, property taxes, and trade 
association membership fees.
Additionally, although not proportional in amount to 
 revenues, under interperiod income tax allocation, reported 
income tax expense is roughly proportional to pretax book in-
come, ignoring permanent differences and graduated rates, etc. 
Accordingly, application of interperiod income tax allocation 
bolsters the argument that corporate income tax is an expense 
because its recognition is roughly proportional to the benefits re-
ceived in the form of pretax book income.29 Consistent with this 
observation, perhaps the method of accounting for the income 
tax determines its conceptual nature rather than vice versa, il-
logical as this conclusion might appear.
These FASB definitions might conceivably be wrong or at 
least subject to revision in a new jointly developed FASB-IASB 
common conceptual framework. However, substantial changes 
in these definitions are not anticipated in any new common 
conceptual framework. More important, as accounting is the 
language of business, some authoritative body should develop 
definitions of the elements of the financial statements so that ac-
counting communicates effectively. Presently, that job rests with 
the FASB. Moreover, these definitions are essentially correct and 
fully consistent with the coalesced proprietary-entity theory of 
the accounting entity.
Equally important, because the objective of financial re-
porting is to provide information that is useful in credit and 
investment decisions [SFAC-1, 1978, paras. 30-32], financial 
statements should provide information needed for credit and 
investment decision models. Many of these decision models are 
specified in the finance literature. These models invariably treat 
income taxes as an expense, not as an income distribution, loss, 
or anomalous deduction. For example, Palepu et al. [2004, pp. 
29 Consistent with interperiod income tax allocation, when net income before 
income taxes is positive, income tax expense is usually positive, absent perma-
nent differences, tax credits, and other items. When net income before income 
taxes is negative, income tax expense is usually negative and is often described 
as income tax benefit. Importantly, income tax benefit represents a reduction of 
positive income tax expense, not a revenue or gain. The same is true of negative 
bad debt expense due to favorable adjustments to offset overestimates of bad debt 
expense of prior periods, and negative professional service expense due to favor-
able adjustments resulting from the overestimates of professional service expense 
of prior periods or refunded amounts due to dissatisfaction with the quality of 
professional services received.
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5-12], Brigham and Ehrhardt [2005, pp. 385-395], Scholes et 
al. [2005, pp. 3, 394], and Penman [2007, pp. 312-315] call for 
including income taxes, along with other expenses, in analyzing 
cash flows, rates of return, and/or net present values in credit 
and investment decisions. The usefulness of financial statements 
should be enhanced by treating income taxes as expense, con-
sistent with the way they are treated in credit and investment 
decision models.
There is also some empirical evidence that viewing the cor-
porate tax as an income distribution rather than an expense en-
joys little acceptance among practicing accountants. In a survey 
of 500 American CPAs, Ricchiute [1977, p. 134] reports that 191 
of 234 respondents view the tax as an expense whereas only 43 
view it as an income distribution. On an overall basis, Ricchiute 
[1979, pp. 70, 72] reports that most of the respondents subscribe 
to the proprietary theory, not the entity theory. Additionally, he 
found no differences among surveyed CPAs in public accounting 
contrasted to those in industry, government, or education.30
According to SFAC No. 2 [1980, paras. 40-41], understand-
ability is an essential qualitative characteristic of accounting 
information. Presumably, using the prevailing view of income 
taxes as an expense enhances user understanding of financial 
statements by minimizing dissonance between preparers and 
users.
In conclusion, the corporate income tax is best viewed as 
an expense rather than as a loss, an income distribution, or an 
anomalous item. But to paraphrase van Hoepen [1981, p. 11], it 
is an expense with some remarkable characteristics.
RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPTUAL NATURE  
OF INCOME TAX TO INCOME STATEMENT AND  
CASH FLOW STATEMENT REPORTING
The controversy over the conceptual nature of the corporate 
30 Kam [1990, p. 318] disagrees with Ricchiute’s findings. He argues that the 
attitudes of stockholders, managers, and the public confirm the entity theory. Kam 
appears to base his views in part on the findings of an Australian study by Moores 
and Steadman [1986, pp. 23-24, 30], which found that “most practicing Aus tralian 
accountants currently subscribe to what has been called a ‘middle position,’ that 
is, they exhibit a propensity to oscillate between the proprietary and entity view-
points [theories].” Somewhat inconsistently, however, Moores and Steadman 
found that “corporate accountants were slightly more disposed to middle posi-
tions and overall appeared more inclined towards proprietary viewpoints. But 
when the total responses are considered, this group clustered on middle ground 
while public accountants were skewed slightly to proprietary viewpoints.” 
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income tax continues to impact its reporting on the income 
statement and cash flow statement.
Income Statement Reporting: One secondary effect of this con-
troversy is the location of income tax expense on the income 
statement. At one time, some companies reported the income 
tax among other expenses, whereas other companies reported it 
separately as a separate deduction from pretax income to derive 
post-tax income [AICPA, 1966, pp. 203-204; Hasselback, 1976, 
p. 275]. Presently, however, almost all companies [e.g., the 2007 
annual reports of Ford, p. 55; General Motors, p. 82; Procter & 
Gamble, p. 49] report income taxes as a separate deduction from 
pretax income from continuing operations to derive post-tax in-
come from continuing operations.
This presentation may well reflect the carryover to the cor-
porate annual report of the SEC’s requirement to report income 
taxes separately in income statements included in annual Form 
10-K reports [see Regulation S-X, 1966, section 4.08(h)]. McLar-
en [1947, pp. 156, 163] notes that reporting income before in-
come taxes pursuant to SEC requirements suggests that the SEC 
views the income tax as an income distribution:
It is perfectly natural for a Federal agency to view in-
come taxes . . . as a profit- sharing arrangement in which 
the government is a participant . . . in keeping with . . . 
basic New Deal theories concerning the relationship . . . 
between government and business.
However, the separate presentation of the income tax does 
not make it a distribution or an anomalous item; it is still an 
expense. Deducting income tax separately from expenses merely 
facilitates user analysis of operations on a pre- and post-tax 
basis. In a multiple-step income statement, cost of goods sold is 
also deducted separately to facilitate analysis of gross margin; it 
is still an expense.
Another secondary effect of the controversy as to the con-
ceptual nature of the corporate income tax is the lingering con-
troversy over interperiod income tax allocation. Some theorists 
[e.g., May, 1945, p. 125; Moonitz, 1957, p. 175; Sprouse, 1957, p. 
377; Davidson, 1958, p. 174; Dewhirst, 1972, p. 42; Van Hoepen, 
1981, p. 12; Beechy, 1983, p. 17] suggest that interperiod income 
tax allocation would not be appropriate if the corporate income 
tax was really an income distribution rather than an expense. 
Other theorists [e.g., Hendriksen, 1958, p. 216; Jaedicke and 
Nelson, 1960, p. 278, fn. 4; Keller, 1961, pp. 29-30] argue that in-
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terperiod allocation should be required even if income taxes are 
an income distribution in order to determine income available 
for distribution as dividends to stockholders without impairing 
capital.
Cash Flow Statement Reporting: Questions concerning the con-
ceptual nature of the corporate income tax may also impact its 
classification in the cash flow statement. Current U.S. GAAP 
classifies all income taxes as an operating flow [SFAS No. 95, 
1987, paras. 91-92], except for the tax benefits from the “wind-
fall” stock option deduction, which are classified as a financing 
flow [SFAS No. 123 (Revised), 2004, para. 68].
Some theorists [e.g., Nurnberg, 1993, pp. 67-69, 2003, pp. 
48-54; Turpen and Slaubaugh, 1994, pp. 35-36; Waxman, 2003, 
pp.18-19] call for intraperiod income tax allocation within the 
cash flow statement for the income tax effects of all investing 
and financing activities in order to sharpen the distinction be-
tween operating, investing, and financing flows.
Presently, the FASB [2008a, paras. 2.21, 2.74, 2.75] pro-
poses to report income taxes in a separate category apart from 
business activities on the cash flow statement. It reasons that 
allocating income taxes among operating, investing, and financ-
ing activities in those statements “would require complex and 
arbitrary allocations that are unlikely to provide useful informa-
tion.” Such a presentation would implicitly treat the income tax 
cash flows differently from cash flows for expenses, losses, or 
income distributions.
RELEVANCE OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE 
CONCEPTUAL NATURE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX TO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTING THEORY
Unless current accounting theory is understood within a 
historical context, no amount of correctness, originality, rigor, or 
elegance will prevent those studying it from sensing a lack of di-
rection and meaning [cf., Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 4-5]. By study-
ing the history of accounting thought, we learn about both the 
fruitfulness and the fruitlessness of theory controversies, about 
how we advance and how we regress, and about why we are as 
far as we actually are but also why we are not further. Hopefully, 
a better understanding of the controversy over the conceptual 
nature of the corporate income tax will preclude fruitless con-
troversies over other issues currently troubling accountants and 
accounting standard setters.
37
Nurnberg: Conceptual nature of the corporate income tax
Published by eGrove, 2009
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200968
For example, a current FASB project is the conceptual dis-
tinction between liabilities and equities [FASB, 2007a]. In some 
ways, this controversy is similar to the one over the conceptual 
nature of the corporate income tax, which in turn relates to the 
conceptual distinctions between expenses and distributions. De-
spite an extensive literature extending over almost a century, the 
controversy over the conceptual nature of the corporate income 
tax remains unresolved, largely because the conceptual distinc-
tions between expenses and income distributions are not always 
unambiguous. Perhaps there is little reason to expect the FASB 
to be more successful in distinguishing between liabilities and 
equities, judging by its recent somewhat unsuccessful efforts at 
ascertaining the conceptual nature of mandatorily redeemable 
preferred stock.
Another example is the current FASB project on the report-
ing entity, including its associated theories. Perhaps there is little 
reason to expect the FASB to be more successful in developing a 
more workable concept of the reporting entity, judging by its 
somewhat unsuccessful and incomplete efforts over more than 
23 years to develop a more workable concept of the consolidated 
entity.
Still another example is the current efforts of the FASB and 
IASB to make accounting more consistent by developing and re-
fining a common conceptual framework. The FASB commenced 
initial efforts on developing a conceptual framework in 1972. 
Although some of its members suggest that its extant conceptual 
framework is helpful in its own deliberations on new accounting 
standards, to date the framework is far from complete, far from 
internally consistent, and far from conceptual throughout, as is 
the joint FASB-IASB proposed common conceptual framework. 
Perhaps the world of accounting and business would be better 
off by following Boulding’s [1962, p. 54] suggestion to educate 
report users and the public as to what accountants do rather 
than developing new and potentially more complex and more 
obtuse conceptual frameworks.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper examines a long-standing controversy about the 
conceptual nature of the corporate income tax. This controversy 
remains unresolved, despite several authoritative pronounce-
ments stating or assuming that the corporate income tax is an 
expense, and despite an extensive discussion in the literature 
over more than one hundred years. This controversy in part 
 reflects different theories of the accounting entity.
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Within the context of a coalesced proprietary-entity theory 
of the accounting entity, the examination of this controversy 
leads to the unsurprising conclusion that the corporate income 
tax is an expense, but an expense with some remarkable charac-
teristics. However, the benefits from examining this controversy 
extend beyond the conclusion that the income tax is an expense. 
The examination provides a historical context in which other 
theory controversies can be examined to greater advantage. It 
shows how the development of accounting thought has pro-
gressed and regressed. It teaches us much about the ways of the 
human mind. Perhaps a better understanding of this contro-
versy may preclude fruitless controversies over other accounting 
theory issues currently troubling accountants and accounting 
standard setters.
Additionally, the controversy as to the conceptual nature of 
the corporate income tax impacts its reporting on the income 
statement and cash flow statement. One manifestation of this 
controversy is the lingering controversy over interperiod tax 
allocation. Another manifestation of this controversy is how to 
report income taxes on the income and cash flow statements. 
No doubt some readers will disagree with the conclusion 
that the corporate income tax is an expense. To some readers, 
the tax defies conceptualization. Perhaps the same is true of 
other conceptual issues currently troubling accounting standard 
setters. For decades, standard setters have called for the devel-
opment of a conceptual framework to help facilitate the develop-
ment of financial accounting standards. But, as indicated by the 
controversy over the corporate income tax, some things are not 
easily conceptualized in the real world. 
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